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Abstract 
Purpose – The main purpose of this study is to investigate the association between gender 
diversity on audit committees and the incidence of financial restatements. 
Design/methodology/approach – Using a sample of 683 firm-year observations from Iranian 
listed companies for the period from 2013 to 2017, this paper uses a logistic regression model 
to examine a research hypothesis related to the association between the presence of female 
directors on the audit committee and the incidence of financial restatements. 
Findings – After controlling for other restatement-related factors, we found that the presence 
of at least one female director on audit committees reduces the likelihood of the incidence of 
financial restatements. Robustness tests also confirmed this result. Moreover, we found that 
independent and financial expert female directors on audit committees are more strongly 
associated with a reduction in financial restatements. Finally, our additional analysis suggests 
that, in firms with gender diversity on audit committees and also the presence of independent 
and financial expert female directors, the likelihood of hiring auditors of a higher quality 
increases. Generally, the findings are consistent with the literature on gender diversity which 
suggests that women perform better in a monitoring role, are more conservative and make 
more ethical decisions. 
Practical implications – The findings of this study could help with the understanding of 
broader participation of female directors on company boards and subgroups such as the audit 
committee, and of the improvement in corporate governance. Moreover, the findings can be 
of particular interest to monitoring authorities and policy makers in developing countries and 
send positive signals to them regarding the recommendation or requirement of gender 
diversity as a part of corporate governance mechanisms.  
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Originality/value – The present study contributes to the extant literature by providing 
empirical evidence on the effect of audit committee gender diversity on financial 
restatements. Furthermore, this study provides evidence on the more effective oversight and 
greater ability of independent female directors and financial expert female directors, 
respectively; which has been significantly disregarded in the previous studies. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Audit committee gender diversity, Financial reporting, 
Restatement, Iran. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The increasing prevalence of financial restatements has been given considerable attention by 
academia (Plumlee & Yohn, 2010). From the perspective of investors, restatements not only 
indicate problems of the previous period but also anticipate upcoming problems of the 
company and its management, which signal significant financial reporting weaknesses and 
can induce extreme market reaction (Akhigbe et al., 2005). In this regard, there is a growing 
research which demonstrates that good corporate governance can lead to a reduction in 
financial restatements and an improvement in financial reporting quality (e.g., Beasley, 1996; 
Abbott et al., 2004; Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Abdullah et al., 2010). Audit committees as 
one of the most important corporate governance mechanisms, play a major role in improving 
the corporate performance and economic earnings (Anderson et al., 2004, Davidson et al., 
2004; Dey, 2008) and ensure financial reporting quality (Klein, 2002). Moreover, audit 
committees monitor the internal controls and the risk management processes (Klein, 1998; 
Krishnan, 2005; Zhang et al., 2007), and also enhances the external auditor’s independence 
and audit quality (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2009; Chan et al, 2013; Soltana et al., 2015). 
Some of the audit committee characteristics such as financial expertise and 
independence are vital for their effectiveness (e.g., Klein, 2002; Abbott et al., 2004; 
Krishnan, 2005). Nonetheless, gender diversity on the boards of directors and committees has 
also recently been considered as one of the factors which enhance their effectiveness (see, 
Chen et al., 2016; Lai et al., 2017; Aldamen et al., 2018). Female directors on the boards 
could both help improve the quality of decisions, provide the board of directors with a boost 
in their ability to monitor corporate disclosure and reports (Carter et al., 2010; Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011) and affect the degree of risk aversion and conservatism when 
making decisions and monitoring the management (Thiruvadi & Huang, 2011). Additionally, 
recent research has revealed that gender diversity can carry out functions for corporate 
governance and can be a potential factor in the activities and independence of the board of 
directors (e.g., Huse & Solberg, 2006; Huse et al., 2009; Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Abbott et 
al., 2012). This literature demonstrates that the presence of female directors on the board and 
its subgroups, such as the audit committee, is not only a matter of gender equality but is also 
a matter of corporate governance demanding sufficient consideration (Aldamen et al., 2018). 
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Soltana et al. (2015) argue that gender differences on the audit committee may ruin the 
activity of the small group, leading to the formation of a majority and minority in the group 
and a decline in the effectiveness of the audit committee. In contrast, gender diversity on 
audit committees composition and the presence of experienced members with different ideas 
can help the audit committee with a wide range of accounting issues, thereby leading to the 
reduction of fraud opportunity and financial misstatements (Gul et al., 2011). However, Chen 
et al. (2016) noted that some companies may appoint female directors with the intention of 
merely lessening criticism. They investigated the effects of board gender diversity on internal 
control weaknesses and provide evidence concerning the failure of critical mass theory. 
According to critical mass theory, female directors are not able to produce any changes 
unless their numbers reach a certain threshold (e.g., three female directors).  In this study, we 
also attempt to provide evidence regarding the credibility of critical mass theory through 
investigating the relationship between gender diversity on the audit committee, one of the 
important subgroups of the board of directors (Kelin, 1998; Xie et al., 2003), and financial 
restatement. 
 Prior literature documents evidence of the relationship between the presence of female 
directors on the board and firm-specific variables such as firm value (Carter et al., 2003), 
return on equity (Ming & Eam, 2016), earnings quality (Srinidhi et al., 2011), earnings 
management (Arun et al., 2015), improvement of the informativeness of stock prices (Gul et 
al., 2011) and internal control weaknesses (Chen et al., 2016). In addition, the relationship 
has been confirmed between the presence of female directors on the audit committee with 
audit fees (Ittonen et al., 2010; Harjoto et al., 2015; Aldamen et al., 2018; Lai et al., 2017), 
auditor choice (Lai et al., 2017) and earnings quality (Thiruvadi & Huang, 2011). 
Furthermore, the association between the presence of female directors on boards and 
corporate performance has been reviewed in prior studies. Some studies have suggested that 
gender diversity on the board of directors has a positive relationship with corporate 
performance (Luckerath, 2010; Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008), whereas other studies 
have found a negative relationship (Bohren & Strom, 2010; Adams & Ferreira, 2009) with 
some other research finding no relationship (Chapple & Humphrey, 2014; Carter et al., 
2010). These mixed results leave the issue of improving organizational performance through 
gender diversity remaining unsolved, despite the huge extant literature. Nevertheless, female 
members appear interested in discussing difficult issues (Chen et al., 2016), are more 
conservative about financial issues (Francis et al., 2015) and play the oversight role 
successfully (Adams & Ferreira, 2009) and appear less tolerant towards opportunistic 
behavior (Thorne et al., 2003); it can be expected, therefore, that companies with female 
members on the board of directors and on its subgroups such as the audit committee increase 
financial reporting quality via reducing mistakes and restatements. Moreover, female 
members on audit committees appear to desire audit information of a higher quality 
(Aldamen et al, 2018) and this can reduce auditor failure to detect mistakes as one of the 
factors which increases restatements (Czerney et al., 2014). 
In some countries, audit committees are either required by law (such as in Canada, 
Singapore and Thailand), mandated by regulators (such as Bangladesh, Malaysia and the 
U.S.), or are highly recommended by the code of best practice (e.g., Britain). In many 
countries, audit committees are not compulsory but companies can constitute audit 
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committees voluntarily. In Iran, the internal control instruction was approved in May 2012 
and communicated in February 2013. Based on this instruction, companies listed on the 
Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) are required to constitute audit committees (TSE, 2013). 
Therefore, considering the fact that audit committees are in their early stage of development 
in Iran and that the effectiveness of audit committee has a significant effect on minimizing 
agency conflicts, safeguarding shareholders’ interests and maximizing the total value of firms 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Dey, 2008), we investigated the effect of effective audit committee 
on financial statement restatements in Iranian firms through gender diversity characteristics 
(Ittonen et al., 2010; Thiruvadi & Huang, 2011; Harjoto et al., 2015; Aldamen et al., 2018). 
Prior research in Iran shows that the high percentage of Iranian companies restates their 
financial statements in order to correct accounting mistakes (e.g., Kordestani et al., 2011; 
Nickbakht & Rafiee, 2013). This can bring the reliability of the accounting information of 
such companies into doubt. Using the data on 683 firm-year observations in the TSE during 
the period 2013-2017, we found that the presence of at least one female director on audit 
committee reduces the likelihood of the incidence of financial restatements. Robustness tests 
also confirmed this result. Moreover, we found that independent and financial expert female 
directors on audit committee are more strongly associated with the reduction in financial 
restatements. Finally, our additional analysis suggests that, in firms with gender diversity on 
the audit committee and also the presence of independent and financial expert female 
directors, the likelihood of hiring auditors of a higher quality increases. Overall, our findings 
reveal that mandating the constitution of audit committees and subsequently the presence of 
female directors on these committees could reduce restatements and enhance the reliability of 
financial statements in Iran.  
This study contributes to the accounting literature in several ways. First, this study 
contributes to the evolving literature on gender diversity and financial restatements. Prior 
research examined the relationship between audit committee characteristics (such as 
independence, size, expertise, and the frequency of audit committee meetings) and financial 
restatements (Abbott et al., 2004; Carcello et al., 2011; Lary & Taylor, 2012, Mohammad et 
al., 2018). Furthermore, Abbott et al. (2012) and Wahid (2018) studied the effect of board 
gender diversity on financial restatements. Nonetheless, the question of whether the presence 
of women on audit committee is associated with restatements remains unsolved. Whilst the 
ultimate responsibility for financial reporting rests with the board of directors, the routine 
responsibility and accountability for the financial reporting process within the firm 
increasingly devolves upon the audit committee which is widely believed to be the most 
important subgroup of the board (Xie et al., 2003). The audit committee is expected to serve a 
pivotal role in assuring the quality of financial reporting. For this reason, a huge number of 
previous studies on restatements and fraud have brought audit committees into focus of 
attention (either in place of or added to/along with the full board) (Abbott et al., 2012). 
Additionally, Adams and Ferreira (2009) found that female members on the board are more 
likely to join supervisory committees. Therefore, it seems that special focus on gender 
diversity on audit committees and its effect on financial reporting is of great importance. 
Second, the importance of our study is beyond bridging the existing gap in the 
literature, as we witness the growing trend towards the presence of female members (Chen et 
al., 2016) and the tendency in global markets towards voluntary or mandatory recruitment of 
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female members on boards (Usman et al., 2018a). Some countries (e.g., Australia, Canada 
and Britain) recommended the participation of women on the board of directors and some 
other countries (e.g., Belgium, France, Netherlands, Italy, Norway and Spain) require the 
presence of women on the boards (Aldamen et al., 2018). Thus, reviewing and understanding 
how female directors participate on the board and its subgroups such as the audit committee 
is necessary for corporate governance improvement and can provide empirical evidence on 
the effectiveness of women in such groups for global markets. Specifically, the evidence of 
the present study may be of use to supervisors and policy makers in developing countries and 
send positive signals to them regarding the recommendation or requirement of gender 
diversity as a part of corporate governance mechanisms. 
Third, in contrast to developed countries, the corporate governance structure in Iran is 
weak (Bagherpour et al., 2014). For instance, in countries like the U.S., all members of the 
audit committee must be independent, while there is no such requirement in Iran where there 
is a combination of female executives and independent female directors on audit committees. 
Therefore, this provides a unique opportunity to investigate whether independent female 
directors on audit committees play a prominent role in financial reporting. Furthermore, 
investigating the role of financial expert female directors on audit committees could be of 
interest. Our findings showed that the relationship between gender diversity on audit 
committees and financial restatements is stronger when female directors have independence 
and financial expertise. These findings contribute to the extant literature and provide new 
evidence on the more effective oversight and greater ability of independent female directors 
and financial experts respectively, compared to female executives and female directors who 
lack financial expertise. Previous studies have reviewed the role of female directors in 
corporate governance, but the suggestion that independent and financial expert female 
directors may perform their oversight function more effectively with greater ability has been 
disregarded (see, Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011; Aldamen et al., 2018). Finally, 
our findings are similar to those of Chen et al. (2016) and are inconsistent with critical mass 
theory, because we show that the presence of, at the very least, one female member on the 
audit committee reduces the likelihood of financial restatement and improves the financial 
reporting quality. This is highly important, owing to the fact that several studies such as 
Joecks et al. (2013) and Torchia et al. (2011) support critical mass theory in settings of firm 
performance and corporate innovation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a background to the 
Iranian context.  Section 3 reviews the theoretical literature and Section 4 reviews the 
empirical literature and develops the research hypothesis. Section 5 presents the research 
design and consecutively the research model and definitions of the research variables. Section 
6 presents the empirical results and discussion. The summary and conclusion are provided in 
Section 7. 
 
2. Institutional background 
Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) is the largest capital market in Iran. TSE first opened in 1968 
and is a member of Federation of Euro-Asian Stock Exchanges. Regarding TSE’s legal 
structure, the regulations and requirements of financial reporting are comparable with those 
of Western countries such as the U.S. (Hesarzadeh, 2018) or some European countries, 
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especially in Eastern Europe (Mashayekhi & Bazaz, 2008). For example the TSE, 
implementing regulations of great importance such as for financial reporting (e.g., internal 
control reports, M&D reports, etc.) or for protecting investors (such as reports on suspicious 
transactions, irregularities and infractions, etc.), is enacting similar regulations to that of large 
capital markets such as in the U.S. (Hesarzadeh, 2018). 
However, corporate governance in Iran is not yet well developed and Iranian companies 
have often met with criticism for their poor corporate governance mechanisms (Bagherpour 
et al., 2014; MohammadRezaei et al, 2018). In addition, prior research has demonstrated that 
there is a greater incidence of financial restatements in Iran when compared to developed 
countries such as the U.S. (e.g., Kordestani et al., 2011; Nickbakht & Rafiee, 2013). This 
raised concerns for regulators facing a reduction in both the credibility of financial reports 
and confidence of investors in the financial statements, pushing them into taking measures to 
mitigate such risks. The adoption of the internal controls instruction in 2012 was one of the 
important steps to improve the quality of financial reports. Based on this instruction, TSE 
firms were required to set up an audit committee and other specialized committees and to 
provide arrangements that interact with the committees and the internal audit unit to establish 
and implement appropriate and effective internal controls (Oradi et al., 2016a). According to 
the audit committee charter, the majority of the committee members should have 
independence and financial expertise, but companies were not required to maintain gender 
diversity on audit committees. However, recent studies in Iran reveal that approximately 11 
percent of companies ensured the presence of at least one woman on their audit committees 
(Imani et al., 2017). Hence, these new Iranian regulations and corporate governance 
characteristics offer an opportunity to conduct research: the present study investigates how 
audit committee gender diversity leads to reductions in financial restatements. Particularly, 
this study has important implications for regulators in the Iranian capital market who are 
looking at ways of reducing harmful issues in financial reporting and improving their 
corporate governance. Recent research on the TSE revealed that the constitution of audit 
committees has been associated with an increase in the transparency of information (Fakhari 
& Rezaei, 2018) and the improvement of corporate performance (Oradi et al., 2016b). 
Particularly, Rezazadeh et al. (2017) suggest that audit committee characteristics (such as 
financial expertise and independence) are associated with a reduction in the restatement of 
financial statements. However, the research into gender diversity on audit committee is very 
limited in Iran. 
3. Theoretical literature review 
2.1. Audit committee and restatement 
Restatement can be considered an important event which indicates poor quality financial 
reporting in previous periods [General Accounting Office (GAO), 2002]. Eilifsen and 
Messier (2000) consider four conditions for audited financial statements to be restated. 
Firstly, material misstatements by a company's due to some inherent risks (e.g., aggressive 
accounting practices of the management, misapplication of accounting principles and 
approaches, etc.). Secondly, misstatements are not detected and prevented by the internal 
controls. Thirdly, the external auditor fails to detect the misstatements and the financial 
statements are issued. Fourthly, the misstatements are detected after a while and, if they are 
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significant, companies will be required to correct, restate and reissue financial statements. 
The urgent need for restatement arises when the first three conditions mentioned above are 
observed in the financial reporting process (Abbott et al., 2004). According to previous 
literature, restatements lead to the reduction of corporate value (Palmrose & Scholz, 2004), a 
negative response on the stock price (Wilson, 2008; Chen et al., 2014), an increase in 
CEO/CFO turnover (Hennes et al., 2008) and litigation risk (Palmrose et al., 2004; Demirkan 
& Fuerman, 2014). Furthermore, restatements can reflect on earnings management (Agrawal 
& Chandha, 2005). Thus, considering the consequences of restatement, it is necessary to 
identify the factors that could reduce financial restatements. 
Prior literature demonstrates that companies with strong corporate governance are more 
engaged in monitoring the financial reporting process (Abdollah et al., 2010) and companies 
who issue financial restatements suffer from a weak governance structure (Efendi et al., 
2007). The board of directors and its subgroups such as the audit committee are the main 
governance mechanisms which play a major oversight role on behalf of shareholders. The 
significance of audit committee has been highlighted by corporate governance laws and 
regulations. For instance, according to Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act (2002), 
public companies are required to constitute audit committees. This law attempts to improve 
the quality of the financial reporting process (Carver, 2013). From the perspective of agency 
theory, audit committees fulfill a significant role in reducing agency problems (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989; Dey, 2008) and can lead to an improvement in financial reporting quality 
(Krishnan et al., 2011). In addition, an effective audit committee improves the quality of 
internal controls over financial reporting (Krishnan, 2005; Zhang et al., 2007) and enhances 
the value of the accounting information (Habib & Azim, 2008). Moreover, McMullen and 
Raghunandan (1996) also suggest that companies with effective audit committees are less 
likely to face mistakes, irregularities, and fraudulent financial reporting.  
2.2. Gender diversity 
Gender theory holds that women have a significant part to play in economic success (Waring, 
1988). Moreover, there are gender-based ethical differences. To illustrate these differences, 
the gender socialization theory of Dawson (1997) could be of great help. According to this 
theory, women exposed to different ethical developments, tend to hold different values 
leading to various outlooks and behavior. For instance, men may attach value to money, 
progress and power and be more willing to enter competitive situations, whereas women 
might pay more attention to social interactions, fulfill their assigned tasks more effectively, 
be more likely to comply with the regulations (Geiger & Connell, 1999) and this may lead to 
the improvement of information (Carter et al., 2010). In addition, research on the field of 
group work points to the fact that gender diverse groups perform differently from same-
gender groups, due to the various experiences and beliefs gender diverse groups have. What 
is more, social diversity (gender, age and ethnic groups) may reduce intergroup 
communication, increase conflict of opinions and disagreements and consequently lead to the 
enhancement of the effectiveness of group decision-making (Ittonen et al., 2010).  
Furthermore, prior research on gender diversity points to behavioral differences 
between males and females. For example, females may possess greater communication skills 
(Westphal & Milton, 2000) and tend to ask the questions which men do not ask (Konrad et 
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al., 2008). They may improve the decision making and the leadership style (Rosener, 1990) 
and pay more attention to qualitative issues such as social responsibility, humanitarianism 
(Hafsi & Turgut, 2013), task orientation and compliance with rules and regulations (Geiger & 
Connell, 1999). Women as compared to men may be more risk-averse (Beckmann & 
Menkhoff, 2008; Bellucci et al, 2010; Thiruvadi & Huang, 2011, Francis et al., 2015), make 
more conservative decisions (Schubert, 2006) and be less tolerant towards opportunistic 
behaviour (Krishnan & Parsons, 2008). Furthermore, women may be less over-confident than 
men (Huang & Kisgen, 2013). Wood et al. (1985) state that women who work in a group can 
put forward better solutions to a problem. They found that men come up with more solutions 
for a specific problem, but the solutions of a higher quality were often offered by women. 
However, there are some concerns that firms may add female members to merely 
reduce criticism: female directors are only tokens (critical mass theory) (Chen et al., 2016). 
Prior research has removed this concern to a large extent and indicated that the presence of at 
least one female director on the board and on its subgroups such as the compensation 
committee and audit committee leads to improvement of corporate performance (e.g., Chen et 
al., 2016; Thiruvadi & Huang, 2011; Usman et al., 2018a). In this study, we extend this 
research stream and explore how women on audit committees can impact financial 
restatements. 
4. Empirical literature review and hypothesis development 
Consistent with gender theory, prior literature suggests that women can play a major role in 
enhancing oversight, board performance and corporate output. Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
present evidence which points to the fact that women perform better in the monitoring role in 
top management. Bart & McQueen (2013) suggest that women make better directors because 
they are more likely to take account of the interests of all stakeholders. The increase in the 
number of female directors on boards benefits the companies, shareholders and customers 
(Grosvold et al., 2007). Davis (2011) found that the presence of one female director on the 
board reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy by up to 20 percent and the presence of two or 
three of them could reduce it even more. Sial et al. (2018) concluded that gender diversity on 
the board results in the improvement of corporate performance. Also, they showed that 
corporate social responsibility modifies the relationship between gender diversity on the 
board and corporate performance. Moreover, Usman et al. (2018b) showed that female 
directors on the board are associated with the development of the CEO’s power. Usman et al. 
(2018c) found that female CEOs lead to the reduction in cost of debt. 
Furthermore, prior research provides evidence on the improvement of financial 
reporting quality as a result of the presence of female directors on the board. For instance; 
gender diversity on the board of directors is associated with the improvement of accruals 
quality (Srinidhi et al., 2011), the accuracy of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts (Gul et 
al., 2013) and the quality of internal controls over financial reporting (Chen et al., 2016). 
Moreover, Barua et al. (2010) reported that companies with female CFOs have earnings of a 
greater quality and such companies are substantially associated with an improvement of 
accounting conservatism in the financial reporting (Francis et al., 2015). 
Abbott et al. (2012) and Wahid (2018) argue that gender diversity on the board of 
directors could result in the board making decisions of a higher quality through an increase in 
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interactions and consideration of different points of the view. They found that gender 
diversity on the board of directors reduces the likelihood of the incidence of financial 
statements restatement. However, empirical evidence about the effect of audit committee 
gender diversity on financial restatements is sparse. Prior studies have focused on the role of 
other characteristics of audit committees on financial restatement. Using data from U.S. 
companies; Abbott et al (2004) and Carcello et al (2011) showed that there is a negative 
relationship between independence, frequency of meetings and financial expertise on audit 
committees and financial restatement. Using data from Australian companies; Lary and 
Taylor (2012) revealed that audit committee independence reduces the incidence and 
intensity of financial restatements. Further, Mohammad et al. (2018) based on a sample of 
Malaysian companies; found that there is a negative relationship between independence, 
frequency of meetings, financial expertise, and the size of audit committees and financial 
restatements.  
Despite the significant role of the audit committee and the necessity for an increase in 
diversity in audit committee composition, the research conducted in this context is relatively 
limited. Thiruadi and Huang (2011) stated that the presence of female directors on audit 
committees improves the quality of operating the audit committee in terms of external 
performance, and reduces earnings management. Ittonen et al. (2010) and Harjoto et al. 
(2015) suggest that audit committees with female members are associated with lower audit 
fees. These authors state that female directors may lower audit fees by affecting auditor 
assessment of audit risk (by improving communication with auditors or by improving internal 
oversight effectiveness and increasing the accuracy of the financial reporting process). On the 
contrary, Aldamen et al. (2018) and Lai et al. (2017) reported that gender diversity on the 
audit committee leads to an increase in audit fees. They argue that women, owing to a higher 
level of conscience, seriousness and responsibility, seek for audits of a higher quality. Higher 
audit quality is associated with detecting material mistakes, thereby reducing restatements 
(Jiang et al., 2015).  
Given gender theory, the literature discussed above and female characteristics such as 
task orientation, better monitoring ability, risk aversion and conservatism, and in line with the 
idea of an association between the reduction of restatements and the presence of women on 
the board of directors (Abbott et al, 2012, Wahid, 2018), we assume that the presence of 
female directors on audit committees strengthens the external governance of the firm and its 
auditor, reduces opportunistic behaviour of the management and mistakes and consequently 
reduces restatements. Therefore, the research hypothesis is as follows: 
H1 : There is a negative association between the presence of female director on the audit 
committee and the incidence of restatement. 
5. Research design 
5.1. Sample and data 
The research sample comprises all the companies listed on the TSE in the period 2013-2017. 
The reason for choosing 2013 as the base year is the communication of the internal controls 
manual requiring the companies listed on the TSE to constitute an audit committee in the year 
2013 (TSE, 2013).  
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Table 1, Sample selection  
Observations 
Initial observations for the period 2013 to 2017 (5 (year) × 325 (firms) = 1,625 1,625 
Less: financial or utility industry firms (5 (year) × 138 (firms) = 690   690 
Less: delisted firms     51 
Less: number of firm-year with missing observations such audit committee characteristics 
data: 
  201 
Number of observations in final analysis    683 
 
The data is collected from the annual reports of the companies listed on the Tehran 
Stock Exchange [1] and the Rahavard-e-Novin database [2]. The initial sample includes 1625 
firm-year observations. The final sample decreases to 683 firm-year observations when 
financial firms and utilities are excluded due to the different nature of the operations of such 
firms (see, Hesarzadeh & Bazrafshan, 2018). Moreover, we excluded the delisted firms and 
observations with insufficient information for measuring the variables. Table 1 outlines the 
sample selection procedure. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to 
reduce the influence of outliers on the regression results.  
5.2. Regression model 
We estimate the following logistic regression model for investigating the relationship 
between the presence of females on audit committees and the incidence of restatements: 
Restateit = β0 + β1Ac_fdit + β2Ac_indpit + β3Ac_expit + β4Ac_sizeit 
                   + β5Board_sizeit + β6Board_indpit + β7CEOchairit + β8Conownit 
                  + β9Instownit + β10Stownit + β11Mgrownit + β12Ageit  
                  + β13Zscoreit + β14Leverageit + β15Financeit + β16Growthit  
                  + β17ROAit + β18Sizeit+ β19Accrualit + β20Weakit + β21Bigit  
                  + β22Specit + Industry Dummies + Year Dummies + it 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
Where, the dependent variable is restatement (Restate), which equals 1 if the financial 
statements of the firm are restated in the year t, otherwise 0. Our independent variable is 
gender diversity (Ac_fd), which equals 1 if there is at least one female director on the audit 
committee, otherwise 0 (Ittonen et al., 2010; Aldamen et al., 2018). In line with prior 
research, we controlled for the variables related to the effectiveness of audit committee which 
are associated with the incidence of restatement (Abbott et al., 2004; Carcello et al., 2011; 
Lary & Taylor; 2012). These variables include audit committee independence (Ac_indp), 
financial expertise (Ac_exp) and size (Ac_size) [3]. 
Furthermore, in accordance with prior research (Basely, 1996; Abbott et al., 2004), we 
controlled for the characteristics of the board of directors including size (Board_size), 
independence (Board_indp) and CEO duality (CEOchair) which could affect the incidence of 
restatement. Decentralized ownership can increase the likelihood of restatements (Defond & 
Jiambalyo, 1991; GAO; 2002). In addition, previous studies demonstrate that there is a 
positive relationship between institutional ownership (Wahid, 2018) and state ownership 
(Wang & Wu, 2011) and restatements. Further, Jiang et al (2015) show a negative relation 
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between managerial ownership and restatements. Accordingly, we included the concentration 
of ownership (Conown), institutional ownership (Instown), state ownership (Stown) and 
managerial ownership (Mgrown) variables in the equation. Furthermore, firm age is 
associated with reporting problems; presumably as the firm age increases, the likelihood of 
restatement decreases, owing to the fact that young firms face problems which may lead to 
more restatements (Basely, 1996). Financial distress also increases the likelihood of 
opportunistic reporting by management and this leads to restatement (Jiang et al., 2015). 
Hence, firm age (Age) and financial distress (Zscore) are included in the equation. In the 
following, we include some firm-level financial variables as the determining factors in 
restatement in the equation (see, Abbott et al., 2004, Almer et al., 2008; Carcello et al., 2011; 
Abbott et al, 2012; Jiang et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2018). These variables include Leverage, 
Finance, Growth, ROA, Size, Accrual. Plumlee and Yohn (2010) consider internal controls 
weakness as one of the determining factors in restatements. Thus, we controlled for internal 
controls weakness (Weak) in the equation. Furthermore, prior studies argue that, with the 
enhancement of audit quality and auditor’s knowledge of the client’s activity, the likelihood 
of restatement decreases (Chin & Chi, 2009; Jiang et al., 2015). Therefore, we controlled for 
auditor size (Big) [4] and auditor industry speciality (Spec) variables as they are proxies for 
audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981; Dunn & Mayhew, 2004). We also include industry and year 
dummy variables in all our regression specification. All the variables are defined in Table 2. 
 
Table 2, Descriptions of variables 
Variable   Description 
Dependent variable  
Restate An indicator variable with the value of 1 for firm-year observations with 
restatement and 0 otherwise 
Independent variable  
Ac_fd An indicator variable with the value of 1 if there is at least one female 
director on the audit committee, and 0 otherwise 
Control variables  
Ac_indp the proportion of independent female directors on the audit committee 
Ac_exp The proportion of audit committee members with financial expertise 
Ac_size The number of audit committee members 
Board_size The number of board members 
Board_indp The proportion of independent directors on the board 
CEOchair An indicator variable with the value of 1 if the CEO and chairman are the 
same and 0 otherwise. 
Conown The proportion of a firm’s outstanding shares that are owned by the largest   
shareholder (=>%5) 
Instown The proportion of shares held by institutional investors 
Stown An indicator variable which equals 1 if the government is the largest 
shareholder (=>%50) 
Mgrown The cumulative managerial share ownership 
Age The natural logarithm of number of years the firm has been established 
Zscore Altman Z Score to predict bankruptcy using the coefficients from the 
original Altman formula. The higher the Z score is, the lower the chance of 
bankruptcy 
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets 
Finance Operating cash flows minus average capital expenditures (it-3 to it-1), divided 
by lagged current assets 
Growth The proportion of change in annual sales revenue 
ROA Net income divided by total assets. 
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Size The natural logarithm of total assets 
Accrual Total accruals to sales, which is calculated as net income minus operating 
cash flows, divided by lagged assets 
Weak An indicator variable with the value of 1 if the auditor reports an internal 
control weakness for the ICFR audit of fiscal year t, 0 otherwise 
Big An indicator variable with the value 1 if the auditor is a Big audit firm, and 
zero otherwise 
Spec An indicator variable with the value of 1 if the client’s audit firm audits at 
least 20 percent of sales in the client’s industry, and 0 otherwise (Casterella 
et al., 2004) 
Additional variables  
Ac_fp The proportion of female directors on the audit committee 
Ac_fbi The Blau index, which is measured as 1- ∑ni=1 P2i, where Pi is the 
proportion of each category and n is the number of categories. In our case, 
n is 2 and the categories are “male” and “female” 
Ac_fsi The Shannon index, which is measured as - ∑ni=1 Pi ln Pi, where Pi is the 
proportion of each category and n is the number of categories. In our case, 
n is 2 and the categories are “male” and “female” 
Ac_findp An indicator variable with the value of 1 if there is at least one independent 
female director on the audit committee, and 0 otherwise 
Ac_fexp An indicator variable with the value of 1 if there is at least one financial 
expert female on the audit committee, and 0 otherwise 
Board_fp The proportion of female directors on the board 
Chta The proportion of change in total assets from the previous year 
Aturn Asset turnover ratio, measured as sales divided by total assets 
Curr Current assets divided by total assets 
Quick Current assets minus inventory divided by current liabilities 
Loss An indicator that equals 1 when firm net income is negative, 0 otherwise 
 
Note: This table defines the main variables. Furthermore, the table includes the definitions of additional 
variables, which is used for robustness tests and additional analyses at the end of the findings section. 
6. Empirical results and discussion 
6.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of variables for the complete sample (panel A) and 
firm-year observations in two groups with restatement and without restatement and 
differences in means (Panel B). Panel A of the Table 3 results show that 66.47 percent of the 
final sample including 683 firm-year observations, used in the final analysis, restated their 
financial statements. The percentage has considerably decreased in comparison with the 
research conducted on the TSE (Nikbakht & Rafeei, 2012) showing that approximately 79 
percent of the companies on the TSE restated their financial statements. In addition, this 
finding is notably higher than the mean of restatements in developed countries (e.g., Chen et 
al., 2016). The findings in panel A also show that the percentage of the presence of at least 
one female member on audit committees (Ac_fd) of the sample firms is 12 which is close to 
the mean of the presence of at least one female member on audit committees in Australia (15 
percent) (Aldamen et al., 2018).  
Furthermore, Panel B of Table 3 indicates that the mean of the Ac_fd in firms without 
restatements is significantly higher than that of firms with restatements. Moreover, Panel B 
demonstrates that, compared to the firms without restatements, firms with restatements have a 
higher CEO duality (CEOchair), state ownership (Stown), firm age (Age), growth of sales 
(Growth), firm size (Size) and internal control weaknesses (Weak). In contrast, firms without 
restatement, in comparison with firms with restatement, have a higher audit committee 
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independence (Ac_indp), board of directors’ independence (Board_indp), managerial 
ownership (Mgrown) and industry specialist auditor selection (Spec).  
Table 4 reports Spearman’s correlations between the variables used in the main 
analysis. Bold denotes significant correlation coefficients at the 10 percent level. The 
correlation between Restate and Ac_fd is negative (-0.18) and statistically significant, 
indicating that audit committee gender diversity may be associated with financial restatement. 
The correlations between the other variables never exceed 50 percent, thus alleviating the 
concerns of the potential of multicollinearity affecting the results. To further check for the 
possibility of multicollinearity between the variables included in our model, we additionally 
calculated the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the independent variables. The VIF scores 
in all models (when estimated regressions) is below the acceptable threshold of 5, suggesting 
that multicollinearity is not a significant issue. 
 
Table 3, Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample (n=683) 
Descriptive statistics for continuous variables: 
Variable Mean SD Min Q1 Q3 Max 
Ac_indp 0.727 0.136 0.33 0.67 0.67 1.00 
Ac_exp 0.866 0.186 0.33 0.67 1.00 1.00 
Ac_size 3.149 0.520 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 
Board_size 5.112 0.391 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 
Board_indp 0.635 0.131 0.20 0.60 0.80 0.86 
Conown 0.813 0.140 0.36 0.73 0.92 0.99 
Instown 0.432 0.283 0.00 0.18 0.66 0.95 
Mgrown 0.207 0.288 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.91 
Age 3.548 0.398 2.64 3.26 3.91 4.14 
Zscore 2.251 1.647       −0.89 1.20 2.96 9.22 
Leverage 0.558 0.208 0.07 0.42 0.71 1.05 
Finance 0.352 0.392       −0.34 0.11 0.49 2.08 
Growth 0.429 1.644       −0.94 -0.06 0.38 11.55 
ROA 0.134 0.150       −0.23 0.03 0.21 0.74 
Size (Ln assets) 14.347 1.425 11.05 13.47 14.94 18.38 
Accrual 0.010 0.147 -0.47 -0.07 0.09 0.54 
Descriptive statistics for dummy variables: 
Variable Min Max frequency 1 (%) 
Restate 0 1 454 66.47 
Ac_fd 0 1 86 12.59 
CEOchair 0 1 141 20.64 
Stown 0 1 100 14.64 
Weak 0 1 213 31.18 
Big 0 1 159 23.25 
Spec 0 1 238 34.85 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics by Restate 
 Restate =1 
(Observations =454) 
Restate = 0 
(Observations =229) 
 
Differences 
in Means 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p-value 
Ac_fd 0.081 0.273 0.213 0.411 −0.132       0.000*** 
Ac_indp 0.713 0.124 0.753 0.154 −0.040       0.000*** 
Ac_exp 0. 858 0.189 0.883 0.178 −0.025 0.103 
Ac_size 3.129 0.486 3.187 0.580 −0.058 0.170 
Board_size 5.121 0.394 5.096 0.385   0.025 0.429 
Board_indp 0.629 0.137 0.648 0.117 −0.019   0.076* 
CEOchair 0.231 0.422 0.157 0.364   0.074     0.023** 
Conown 0.810 0.144 0.817 0.131 −0.007 0.571 
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Instown 0.424 0.285 0.448 0.279 −0.024 0.292 
Stown 0.162 0.369 0.113 0.317   0.049   0.084* 
Mgrown 0.193 0.277 0.234 0.308 −0.041   0.080* 
Age 3.579 0.410 3.487 0.366   0.092       0.004*** 
Zscore 2.260 1.766 2.232 1.385   0.028 0.834 
Leverage 0.564 0.211 0.545 0.202   0.019 0.254 
Finance 0.352 0.406 0.354 0.365   0.002 0.942 
Growth 0.534 1.907 0.222 0.893   0.312     0.019** 
ROA 0.130 0.150 0.141 0.152   0.011 0.396 
Size (Ln assets) 14.431 1.444 14.181 1.372   0.250     0.029** 
Accrual 0.011 0.143 0.007 0.153   0.004 0.714 
Weak 0.350 0.477 0.235 0.425   0.115       0.002*** 
Big 0.236 0.424 0.227 0.419   0.009 0.801 
Spec 0.319 0.466 0.406 0.492 −0.087     0.024** 
 
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main analysis. 
*,**,***Significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
Table 4, Spearman rank correlation matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1)  1.00             
(2) -0.18  1.00            
(3) -0.15  0.11  1.00           
(4) -0.06  0.06 -0.10  1.00          
(5) -0.04  0.08  0.05 -0.13  1.00         
(6)  0.05  0.09  0.05 -0.01  0.10  1.00        
(7) -0.05  0.07 -0.07  0.21 -0.02  0.25  1.00       
(8)  0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.00  0.06 -0.10 -0.10  1.00      
(9) -0.00 -0.13  0.02 -0.03  0.06  0.07  0.07 -0.05  1.00     
(10) -0.04  0.02  0.03 -0.15  0.09  0.01 -0.03 0.03  0.23  1.00    
(11)  0.06 -0.15  0.02 -0.07  0.00 -0.02 -0.17 -0.07 -0.11 -0.13  1.00   
(12) -0.03  0.00 -0.05  0.02 -0.02 -0.19 -0.04  0.11  0.18 -0.02 -0.17  1.00  
(13)  0.12 -0.10  0.04  0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 -0.21 -0.11  0.18 -0.05  1.00 
(14) -0.03  0.08  0.00  0.02  0.05  0.04  0.03 -0.01  0.10  0.07 -0.04  0.01 -0.05 
(15)  0.04 -0.10  0.00 -0.08 -0.10 -0.16 -0.15  0.06 -0.04 -0.14  0.12  0.12 -0.03 
(16) -0.03  0.03  0.00  0.13  0.06  0.10  0.19 -0.15  0.19  0.03 -0.03  0.01 -0.02 
(17)  0.04  0.06  0.06 -0.00 -0.01  0.02  0.02 -0.01  0.03  0.00 -0.05  0.01 -0.05 
(18) -0.02  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.11  0.16 -0.02  0.18  0.13 -0.11  0.06  0.01 
(19)  0.09 -0.09  0.04  0.02  0.12  0.20  0.09  0.01  0.04 -0.01  0.22 -0.04  0.00 
(20)  0.03  0.07  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.01  0.05  0.00  0.07 -0.05  0.02  0.02 
(21)  0.11 -0.05 -0.13  0.01  0.00 -0.01 -0.03  0.02 -0.01  0.01 -0.01  0.00 -0.01 
(22)  0.00 -0.11  0.09 -0.04 -0.06  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.19  0.09  0.21 
(23) -0.08  0.03  0.01  0.04 -0.01  0.10  0.05 -0.00  0.07 -0.08  0.22  0.02  0.08 
              
 (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23)    
(14)  1.00             
(15) -0.35  1.00            
(16)  0.26 -0.22  1.00           
(17) -0.49 -0.06  0.11  1.00          
(18)  0.75 -0.53  0.42  0.38  1.00         
(19) -0.09  0.05  0.14 -0.03  0.04  1.00        
(20)  0.45 -0.33 -0.34  0.30  0.56 -0.00  1.00       
(21) -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.11 -0.05 -0.00 -0.03  1.00      
(22) -0.01  0.04 -0.01 -0.02  0.02  0.23  0.05 -0.07  1.00     
(23)  0.11 -0.00  0.06 -0.02  0.12  0.17  0.04 -0.02  0.54  1.00    
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Notes: 1, Restate, 2, Ac_fd. 3, Ac_indp. 4, Ac_exp.  5, Ac_size. 6, Board_size. 7, Board_indp. 8, 
CEOchair. 9, Conown. 10, Instown. 11, Stown. 12, Mgrown. 13, Age. 14, Zscore. 15, Leverage. 16, 
Finance. 17, Growth. 18, ROA. 19, Size. 20, Accrual. 21, Weak. 22. Big. 23, Spce.  
Coefficients in bold are significant at 0.10 levels. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
 
6.2. Regression results 
Table 5 indicates the details of the relationship between audit committee gender 
diversity and the incidence of restatement. Evidence reveals that audit committee gender 
diversity impacts the likelihood of restating the financial statements. In particular, the 
coefficient of audit committee gender diversity (Ac_fd) is (-0.730) and Z-Stat is equal −2.61 
with a significance level of 0.01, which shows that the presence of at least one female 
director on the audit committee has a negative relationship with restatements and thus the 
research hypothesis is supported. This finding is consistent with prior research on board 
gender diversity and restatement (Abbott et al. 2012; Wahid, 2018) and supports gender 
theory, because gender diversity is a factor of organizational success and information 
improvement (Carter et al., 2010). A reason for this implication can be that female directors 
are more risk averse (e.g., Francis et al., 2015), do not tolerate opportunistic behavior 
(Krishnan & Parsons, 2008) and are inclined to reports of a high quality (Thiruvadi & Huang, 
2011). 
 
Table 5, Main regression results and alternative measures of audit committee gender diversity 
Variable Coefficient Z-Stat Coefficient Z-Stat Coefficient Z-Stat Coefficient Z-Stat 
Ac_fd −0.730*** −2.61       
Ac_fp   −2.169** −2.46     
Ac_fbi     −1.643** −2.51   
Ac_fsi       −1.152** −2.54 
Ac_indp −0.783*** −2.66 −1.899*** −2.70 −1.891*** −2.69 −1.886*** −2.68 
Ac_exp −0.907 −1.62 −0.906 −1.62 −0.907 −1.62 −0.906 −1.62 
Ac_size −0.467** −2.35 −0.463** −2.50 −0.455**  −2.46 −0.450** −2.43 
Board_size   0.355   1.30   0.355  1.30   0.355    1.30   0.355   1.30 
Board_indp −1.057 −1.39 −1.035 −1.56 −1.042   −1.37 −1.046 −1.37 
CEOchair   0.601**   2.44   0.597**   2.42   0.598**    2.43   0.598**   2.43 
Conown −0.195 −0.25 −0.165 −0.21 −0.176  −0.23 −0.181 −0.23 
Instown −0.282 −0.81 −0.285 −0.82 −0.284  −0.81 −0.283 −0.81 
Stown −0.360 −1.05 −0.352 −1.03 −0.355  −1.04 −0.356  −1.04 
Mgrown −0.299 −0.84 −0.298 −0.83 −0.299  −0.83 −0.299 −0.83 
Age   0.899***   3.50   0.900***   3.51   0.899***    3.51   0.899***   3.50 
Zscore   0.020   0.19   0.023   0.22   0.022    0.21   0.022   0.20 
Leverage   0.211   0.37   0.209   0.36   0.210    0.36   0.210   0.37 
Finance   0.496   1.13   0.490   1.12   0.492    1.12   0.493   1.12 
Growth   0.159*   1.66   0.159*   1.66   0.159*    1.66   0.159*   1.66 
ROA −0.898  −0.61 −0.930 −0.63 −0.919  −0.62 −0.914 −0.62 
Size   0.275***   2.98   0.274***   2.97   0.274***    2.97   0.275***   2.97 
Accrual   1.500   1.25   1.490   1.25   1.495    1.25   1.496   1.25 
Weak   0.511**  2.44   0.504**   2.41   0.506**    2.42   0.507**   2.43 
Big   0.076  0.27   0.080   0.29   0.078    0.28   0.078   0.28 
Spec −0.548**  −2.27 −0.555** −2.30 −0.552**  −2.29 −0.551** −2.28 
Constant −2.817  −1.28 −2.753 −1.25 −2.768  −1.26 −2.780 −1.26 
IndustryDum Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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YearDum Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LR (prob) 118.31*** (0.000) 117.55*** (0.000) 117.81*** (0.000) 117.94*** (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.1358 0.1349 0.1352 0.1354 
N 683 683 683 683 
     
*,**,***Significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
 
In the following, the evidence demonstrates that there is a significant negative 
relationship between audit committee independence (Ac_indp) and audit committee size 
(Ac_size) with restatement. These results are consistent with prior research (Abbott et al., 
2004; Carcello et al., 2011; Lary & Taylor, 2012) and show that, with an increase in audit 
committee effectiveness, the likelihood of incorrect reporting decreases. Additionally, the 
evidence consistent with Abbott et al. (2012) demonstrates a significant positive relationship 
between CEO duality (CEOchair) and restatement which points to the fact that companies 
with weak corporate governance are more likely to restate their financial statements. 
Moreover, the findings also reveal that firm characteristics including firm age (Age), sales 
growth (Growth) and firm size (Size) are significantly associated with restatement. 
Furthermore, consistent with prior research, internal controls weakness (Weak) has a 
significant positive relationship with restatement (Plumlee & Yohn, 2010) and the audit 
quality measured by hiring an industry specialist auditor (Spec) reduces restatement (Chin & 
Chi, 2009). 
 
6.3. Robustness tests 
6.3.1. Alternative measures of audit committee gender diversity 
To ensure the further robustness of our findings, we used three alternative measures of gender 
diversity on audit committees (see, Sial et al., 2018; Usman et al., 2018a), including: Ac_fp, 
Ac_fbi, and Ac_fsi. Ac_fp is the proportion of female directors on the audit committee, while 
Ac_fbi and Ac_fsi are two comprehensive measures of gender diversity on the audit 
committee measured using formulas from the Blau index (Blau, 1977) and the Shannon index 
(Shannon, 1948), respectively (see Table 2). Table 5 shows that the gender-diversity 
measures (Ac_fp, Ac_fbi, and Ac_fsi) remain significant and negative. These results are 
consistent with our main findings. 
6.3.2. Problem of Endogeneity 
Recently, research on boardroom gender diversity or board sub-committees gender diversity 
(i.e., on the compensation or audit committees) are more concerned about the endogeneity 
issues. For example, previous studies (Green & Homroy, 2018; Wahid, 2018, Usman et al., 
2018a; 2018b; Sial et al., 2018) noted that gender diversity can be an endogenous variable. 
Therefore, we use three procedures for mitigating endogeneity concerns. First, following the 
works of Usman et al (2018a, 2018b) and Sial et al. (2018), we use the one-year lagged audit 
committee gender diversity proxy because female directors need some time to affect firm 
performance. In Method-1 of Table 6, the coefficient of Ac_fd was significant and negative. 
These results are similar to our previous findings that gender-diverse audit committees reduce 
the likelihood of financial restatements. 
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Second, we used instrumental variables and estimated our main regression via the 
probit model with endogenous. In line with Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014), Usman et al 
(2018a, 2018b) and Sial et al. (2018), we used the two instrumental variables for gender 
diversity—i.e., lagged values and the industry average of audit committees’ gender-diversity 
measures —that are most likely to meet the exclusion restriction (i.e., correlated with the 
decision to have female directors on the audit committee but not correlated with financial 
restatement). Method-2 of Table 6 shows that the coefficients of Ac_fd remain negative and 
significant. These results validate our main findings. 
Third, we used the propensity-score-matching method (PSM) because firms with and 
without a gender-diverse audit committee may vary in characteristics and it may be the case 
that the incidence of financial restatements are due to these characteristics rather than due to 
audit committee gender diversity. In line with previous studies (see, Bugeja et al., 2016; 
Usman et al., 2018), PSM is based on the probability that a firm has at least one female 
director on its audit committee (Ac_fd) based on the firm size (Size), board size (Board_size), 
the proportion of female directors on the board (Board_fp), the proportion of independent 
directors on the board (Board_indp) and institutional ownership (Instown) [5]. Method-3 of 
Table 6 shows that the results based on PSM are consistent with our main findings in Table 5 
[6]. Overall, the results show that our main findings have not been affected by endogeneity. 
 
Table 6, Endogeneity test 
Method (1) 
Lag  of gender diversity 
(2) 
Instrumental variables 
(3) 
Propensity score matching 
Variable Coefficient Z-Stat Coefficient Z-Stat Coefficient Z-Stat 
Ac_fd −0.719** −2.31 −0.667** −2.38  −5.851*** −3.40 
Ac_indp −1.881** −2.41 −0.938** −2.03  −4.537 −1.22 
Ac_exp    −0.800 −1.26    −0.408 −1.11    2.992   0.79 
Ac_size −0.468** −2.27    −0.238* −1.91  −0.823 −0.60 
Board_size      0.400   1.25      0.220   1.25  −0.855 −0.53 
Board_indp    −0.797 −0.94    −0.427 −0.84  −5.455 −1.11 
CEOchair      0.695**   2.54    0.383**   2.39    0.788   0.76 
Conown    −0.745 −0.86    −0.564 −1.07  −3.499 −0.76 
Instown    −0.059 −0.15      0.014   0.06  −1.117 −0.61 
Stown    −0.557 −1.46    −0.325 −1.44  −3.341 −1.49 
Mgrown    −0.262 −0.64    −0.110 −0.45  −4.641** −2.52 
Age      0.866***   2.94      0.505***   2.89  −1.140 −0.64 
Zscore      0.029   0.23      0.008   0.11  −2.521*** −3.03 
Leverage    −0.051 −0.08    −0.007 −0.02    4.444*   1.79 
Finance      0.769   1.39      0.480   1.49    8.493***   2.66 
Growth      0.121   1.15      0.079   1.35    1.140**   2.54 
ROA    −1.306 −0.76    −0.636 −0.62  −7.240 −1.19 
Size      0.321***   3.04      0.170***   2.77  −0.715   1.13 
Accrual      1.885   1.34      1.064   1.29  19.754***   2.90 
Weak     0.687***   2.87      0.411***   2.92    0.085   0.10 
Big      0.096   0.30    −0.009 −0.05    1.553   1.00 
Spec    −0.586** −2.17    −0.282* −1.73    2.371**   2.12 
Constant    −3.647 −1.44    −2.028   1.41  36.726**   2.20 
IndustryDum Yes Yes Yes 
YearDum Yes Yes Yes 
LR (prob) 110.26*** (0.000)  74.23*** (0.000) 
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Wald (prob) --- 93.45*** (0.000) --- 
Pseudo R2 0.1569 --- 0.5159 
N 541 541 106 
    
*,**,***Significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
 
6.4. Additional test 
6.4.1. Independent female directors and financial expert 
Corporate governance research has determined that independence is the prerequisite for an 
effective independent oversight role by directors; and greater independence leads audit 
committee members to fulfill their oversight responsibilities more effectively (Kelin, 2002). 
Moreover, financial expert members of audit committees perform their oversight functions in 
the financial reporting process (such as detecting significant misstatements) also more 
effectively (Defond et al., 2005). Goodwin (2003) points out that, in addition to 
independence, audit committee members need to have accounting knowledge or a financial 
background, because financial expertise and independence lead to the enhancement of 
members’ ability to monitor corporate performance and the financial reporting process. 
Existing evidence suggests that independent and financial expert directors can improve 
financial reporting quality through reducing financial restatements (Abbott et al., 2004; 
Carcello et al., 2011; Lary & Taylor, 2012, Mohammad et al., 2018). Therefore, we expect 
that independent and financial expert female directors have a greater impact on the reduction 
in financial restatements, compared to the female executives and female directors who lack 
financial expertise. In this respect, we use dummy variables for independent female directors 
(Ac_findp) and financial expert female directors (Ac_fexp) to examine the effect of 
independent and financial expert female directors (Table 2 provides the definitions of these 
variables). The coefficients of Ac_findp and Ac_fexp in Table 7 are negative and significant. 
These results support prior literature and indicate that independent and financial expert 
female directors on audit committees are more strongly associated with the reduction in 
financial restatements. 
Table 7, Regressions results of independent female directors and financial experts 
Variable Coefficient Z-Stat Coefficient Z-Stat 
Ac_findp    −1.425*** −4.24   
Ac_fexp   −0.946*** −2.95 
Ac_indp        −1.667** −2.40 
Ac_exp    −0.732 −1.32   
Ac_size    −0.447** −2.39      −0.411** −2.25 
Board_size      0.161   0.62        0.234   0.89 
Board_indp    −1.075 −1.40      −1.169 −1.54 
CEOchair      0.642***   2.62        0.533**   2.17 
Conown    −0.434 −0.56      −0.200 −0.26 
Instown    −0.303 −0.87      −0.226 −0.66 
Stown    −0.502 −1.47      −0.359 −1.06 
Mgrown    −0.088 −0.25      −0.289 −0.81 
Age      0.925***   3.60        0.873***   3.42 
Zscore      0.006   0.06        0.018   0.17 
Leverage      0.271   0.46        0.290   0.51 
Finance      0.508   1.14        0.455   1.04 
Growth      0.167*   1.71        0.160*   1.66 
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ROA    −0.599 −0.40      −0.882 −0.60 
Size      0.270***   2.91        0.278***   3.02 
Accrual      1.462   1.22        1.526   1.28 
Weak      0.585***   2.80 0.517**   2.49 
Big      0.018   0.07        0.146   0.53 
Spec    −0.496** −2.06      −0.606** −2.54 
Constant    −3.170 −1.46      −3.106 −1.45 
IndustryDum Yes Yes 
YearDum Yes Yes 
LR (prob) 122.19*** (0.000) 117.05*** (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.1402 0.1343 
N 683 683 
    
*,**,***Significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
6.4.2. Audit committee gender diversity and auditor choice 
Aldamen et al. (2018) argues that the presence of females on audit committees 
increases the likelihood of hiring auditors of a greater quality. Furthermore, Lai et al. (2017) 
found that the presence of at least one female member on audit committees is associated with 
an increase in the likelihood of hiring higher quality auditors. Moreover, prior studies 
demonstrate that with the increase in audit quality, the likelihood of restatement decreases 
(Chin & Chi, 2009; Jiang et al, 2015). Thus, we investigate whether audit committee gender 
diversity is associated with the likelihood of hiring industry specialist auditors as a measure 
of audit quality (Dunn & Mayhew, 2004; Kang, 2014). Given the research evidence and the 
negative relationship between audit committee gender diversity and likelihood of restatement, 
it is expected that the presence of females on audit committee increases the probability of 
hiring industry specialist auditors. The evidence of Table 8 supports the hypothesis and 
indicates that there is a significant positive relationship between audit committee gender 
diversity measures and hiring industry specialist auditors. This finding is consistent with 
previous studies (Aldamen et al., 2018; Lai et al., 2017) and supports their results. 
 
Table 8, Regressions results of audit committee gender diversity and auditor choice 
Variable Coefficient 
[Z-Stat] 
Coefficient 
[Z-Stat] 
Coefficient 
[Z-Stat] 
Coefficient 
[Z-Stat] 
Coefficient 
[Z-Stat] 
Coefficient 
[Z-Stat] 
Ac_fd   0.861*** 
   [3.00] 
     
Ac_fp    2.647*** 
   [2.94] 
    
Ac_fbi     1.983*** 
   [2.96] 
   
Ac_fsi      1.383*** 
   [2.97] 
  
Ac_findp       1.163*** 
    [3.31] 
 
Ac_fexp      
 
  0.648** 
    [1.98] 
Control Variable Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IndustryDum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YearDum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LR 
[prob] 
150.11*** 
[0.000] 
149.75*** 
[0.000] 
149.88** 
[0.000] 
149.95*** 
[0.000] 
151.90*** 
[0.000] 
144.69*** 
[0.000] 
Pseudo R2 0.1700 0.1696 0.1697 0.1699 0.1720 0.1638 
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N 683 683 683 683 683 683 
       
Notes: According to prior research (Chaney et al. 2004; Kang, 2014; among others), we estimate the 
following logistic regression model for investigating the relationship between the presence of females 
on audit committees and auditor choice:  
Specit = β0 + β1Ac_fdit + β2Ac_indpit + β3Ac_expit + β4Ac_sizeit + β5Board_sizeit 
               + β6Board_indpit + β7CEOchairit + β8Conownit + β9Instownit +β10Stownit  
               + β11Mgrownit + β12Leverageit + β13ROAit + β14Sizeit + β15Lossit + β16Chtait  
               + β17Aturnit + β18Currit + β19Quickit + Industry Dummies + Year Dummies + it 
 
*,**,***Significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. See Table 2 for variable definitions 
 
7. Summary and conclusion 
In this study, we investigated the relationship between audit committee gender diversity and 
financial restatements. Using a sample of Iranian listed companies for the period 2013-2017, 
we found that the presence of at least one woman on the audit committee reduces the 
likelihood of financial restatement. Additionally, our findings indicate that independent and 
financial expert female directors on the audit committee are more strongly associated with the 
reduction in the likelihood of financial restatement. Moreover, our results reveal that audit 
committee gender diversity can increase the likelihood of hiring higher quality auditors. 
The findings of this study make three important contributions. First, this study 
contributes to the growing literature on board gender diversity and financial restatements 
(Abbott et al., 2012; Wahid, 2018). Furthermore, previous studies examined the effects of 
audit committee characteristics (such as financial expertise, independence, size and the 
frequency of meetings) on financial statement restatements (e.g., Abbott et al., 2004; Carcello 
et al., 2011), but gender diversity as an audit committee characteristic was not examined. This 
being so, the present study bridges an important research gap by examining the effect of 
gender diversity on the audit committee, as one of the important subgroups of the board, on 
financial reporting. Apart from this, our study adds to the literature on the effect of board 
gender diversity on the selection of auditors of a higher quality (Lai et al., 2017). Second, by 
investigating the effect of independent and financial expert female directors, we contribute to 
the extant literature and provide new evidence on the more effective oversight role and 
greater ability of independent female directors and financial expert female directors, 
respectively, that is compared to female executives and female directors without financial 
expertise; which has been significantly disregarded in prior research. Furthermore, our 
findings are consistent with the literature on gender diversity which suggests that women 
perform better in a monitoring role, are more conservative and make more ethical decisions. 
Also, the results are inconsistent with critical mass theory and show that female directors are 
not merely tokens; even one female director can reduce the likelihood of financial 
restatement. Third, the practical implications of this study support the notion that gender 
diversity on the board and its subgroups such as the audit committee is an important issue in 
corporate governance. Considering our research findings, we suggest that the presence of 
female directors can improve corporate governance in developing countries, where 
governance and investor protection mechanisms are weak (e.g., Iran). In particular, the 
findings of this study send positive signals to the supervisors and policy makers in developing 
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countries regarding recommending or requiring gender diversity in audit committee 
composition. 
This study has some limitations which suggest directions for ongoing studies. First, we 
used data from an emerging market (Iran), so our findings may not be generalizable outside 
of Iran, and where the hypothesis must be tested further. In particular, in western countries, 
the presence of females in leadership and management positions is stronger than in Islamic 
countries (e.g., Iran). Regarding the low presence of females on audit committees in Iran, this 
study facilitates conducting future research on this topic in the other countries, where the 
presence of female directors on the boards and audit committees is stronger. Second, the fact 
that board gender diversity is not mandatory in the data we used, provides an opportunity to 
compare female directors’ economic effect in countries that require gender diversity on the 
boards with those that do not impose such requirement. Our study contributes to the heated 
debate on whether mandatory and non-mandatory quotas for women in the boardroom lead to 
the same consequences. Finally, future research can investigate whether the other 
characteristics of females on boards and audit committees (such as tenure, education, age, 
etc.) can affect the likelihood of financial restatements. In addition, a promising scope for 
future research is a further investigation into the effect of female CEOs and CFOs on the 
likelihood of financial restatements in emerging markets, because they are directly engaged 
in management practices. 
Notes  
1. The annual reports of the companies in the TSE are available at the research, development 
and Islamic studies center (www.RDIS.ir/CompaniesReports.asp) and (www.Codal.ir). 
2. The Rahavard-e-Novin database is the most comprehensive database in the Iranian capital 
market. The full version of this database contains financial reports and information on the 
capital market. It further provides various options for essential technical analysis (Hesarzadeh 
& Bazrafshan, 2018). 
3. Due to the improper disclosure of audit committee meetings, we are not able to control for 
the frequency of audit committee meetings variable in the model. Nonetheless, the three other 
variables of audit committee (independence, financial expertise and size) are controlled. 
4. The international big audit firms (BIG4) have not set up their activities in Iran (see, 
Bagherpoor et al., 2014; MohamadRezaee & Mohd-Saleh, 2018). The Audit Organization of 
Iran is a government entity which is known as the largest audit firm in Iran. Therefore, 
similar to Hesarzadeh and Bazrafshan (2018), we classify audit firms in two groups of big 
(the audit organization) and small (the other audit firms). 
5. By obtaining the fitted values from the regression on the potential determinants of female 
directors on the audit committee, this paper matches each firm-year observation to another 
one with the closest fitted value (within 5 percent) in the same year and the same industry, 
following Lawrence et al. (2011) and Hesarzadeh and Bazrafshan (2018). 
6. Ideally our sample should have comprised 172 firm-year observations (86 firm-year 
observations in each group), because in our full sample there were 86 firm-year observations 
with at least one female director on the audit committee. However, due to unavailability of a 
nearest neighbor for every firm-year observation, our sample is reduced to 106 firm-year 
observations (53 firm-year observations in each group). 
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